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ABSTRACT
 is paper intends to contribute to the literature on investment funds in emerging markets by looking at the performance of 
multimarket funds in Brazil from a manager perspective.  e aim of the paper was to analyze whether some characteristics 
of investment fund managers, as well as their portfolio holdings, can a ect fund performance. In emerging countries both 
portfolio asset allocation and manager characteristics can help explain di erences in the fund performance, which increases 
the relevance of this study.  erefore, the impact of this research lies in its revealing a signi cant relationship between risk-
adjusted return and the portion of portfolios allocated to  xed or variable income, which seems that have not been explored 
in the context of emerging economies yet. A total of 6,002 multimarket funds were analyzed, covering the period between 
September 2009 and December 2015, using panel data with robust standard errors clustered by funds. We also employed robust 
statistics in order to assess some potential biases due to outliers, by analyzing the breakdown point in the estimated models. 
It should be noted that portfolio composition (allocation of portfolios into variable income and  xed income) was the most 
important factor in explaining a potential change in the performance of Brazilian multimarket funds. Also important were 
the e ectiveness of the management of these funds, that is, the best risk-adjusted returns were delivered by less experienced 
managers, funds investing more in  xed income, managers with more funds under management, and larger funds.
Keywords: portfolio composition, risk-adjusted return, manager characteristics, emerging markets.
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1. INTRODUCTION
On one hand, investors have shown more and more 
interest in investing their resources in investment funds, 
seeing the possibility of liquidity, portfolio diversi cation, 
resource management by specialized professionals, 
and superior/abnormal expected returns (Borges & 
Martelanc, 2015; Laes & Silva, 2014; Nanda, Narayanan, 
& Warther, 2000; Varga & Wengert, 2011). In addition, 
both sophisticated investors (such as market analysts) 
and non-professional investors have found in funds the 
possibility of freedom of movement (entry and exit) and 
access to the diversity of assets in the economy (Funchal, 
Lourenço, & Motoki, 2016). Knowledge obtained through 
 nancial education increases the importance of saving, 
and funds represent an alternative with considerable 
growth in the Brazilian market (Borges & Martelanc, 
2015). On the other hand, investment professionals, for 
example fund administrators and managers, can use fund 
performance as marketing in order to attract the attention 
of investors with the possibilities of maximizing earnings 
(Gupta & Jithendranathan, 2012). However, their abilities 
can also de ne their investment management style, thus 
becoming a guide when choosing the fund to invest in 
(Abinzano, Muga, & Santamaria, 2010).
In this context, the  nancial markets of emerging 
countries stand out in meeting the needs of both investors 
and fund managers, with them being more receptive 
(Aggarwal & Jorion, 2010) and seen as less e  cient and 
providing more chances for managers to deliver excess 
returns to investors (Huij & Post, 2011).  ese chances can 
derive both from market factors and di erentiated styles 
of allocating resources in the funds’ portfolios (Maestri 
& Malaquias, 2017).
In addition, the investment fund industry can be seen 
as an exception to the economic principle that  nancial 
agents derive income from having a competitive advantage, 
since fund managers are among the best paid professionals 
in society; however, there is still a knowledge gap regarding 
whether they have the ability to manage money or not 
(Berk & Van Binsbergen, 2015). In fact, in the  nancial 
markets of Greece, Poland, and India, no evidence has 
been found of any greater ability to deliver excess returns 
to investors (Filippas & Psoma, 2001; Sharma & Paul, 
2015; Swinkels & Rzezniczak, 2009). 
Nonetheless, in Brazil researchers report that some 
managers present investment skills that generate excess 
returns (Castro & Minardi, 2009; Jordão & Moura, 2011; 
Rochman & Eid Jr., 2006). However, these Brazilian studies 
have basically used market factors [such as Interbank 
Deposit Certificates (CDIs), the Special System for 
Settlement and Custody (Selic), the Bovespa Index 
(Ibovespa), and savings accounts] and performance-
linked models (such as French, Carhart, and Jensen). 
An opportunity is also perceived to evaluate investment 
portfolios in order to identify whether resource allocation 
by asset type interferes in fund performance, especially 
for multimarket funds, which are similar to hedge funds.
 erefore, this knowledge gap regarding the choice of 
portfolio composition should be noted because depending 
on the investment policy of the particular fund, hedge 
fund managers can have more  exibility with regards 
to where and how to invest resources, including in low 
liquidity investments (Eling & Faust, 2010; Jagannathan, 
Malakhov, & Novikov, 2010).  us, fund performance can 
be in uenced by the choice of assets that compose their 
portfolios and also by some manager characteristics, such 
as experience, the quantity of funds under management, 
and their location.
In light of the lack of Brazilian studies concerning 
the possibility of fund performance being a ected by 
the manager’s characteristics in terms of the choice of 
assets that compose the portfolios, this paper addressed 
Brazilian multimarket investment funds with the aim of 
identifying whether some characteristics of their managers 
and the composition of their portfolios in uence the 
performance of these funds. With this in mind, this 
paper tends to contribute to the literature by inserting 
the characteristics of the manager into the choice of assets 
that compose the portfolios and into the performance of 
Brazilian multimarket funds, thus contributing towards 
minimizing the scarcity of research on the abilities of fund 
managers in emerging markets (Swinkels & Rzezniczak, 
2009).
Based on the results of the research, the main 
contribution of this study lies in revealing a variable 
(composition of portfolios in variable income) that helps 
explain the risk-adjusted return achieved by the funds. 
 is variable presented the highest beta coe  cient in the 
estimated models and was thus shown to be an important 
piece of information to be considered by investors when 
selecting funds with better performance indicators. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Portfolio Allocation and Fund Performance
Shawky, Daí, and Cumming (2012) point out that 
diversi cation can a ect hedge fund performance.  ey 
found that funds that diversi ed into sectors and asset 
classes presented a positive relationship with performance. 
In contrast, diversi cation through investment style and 
geographical location presented a negative relationship 
with performance (Shawky et al., 2012).
In addition, the activity of managing resources in 
fund portfolios with the aim of achieving better returns 
may be related to the manager’s ability (Avramov & 
Wermers, 2006; Berk and Van Binsbergen, 2015; Edwards 
& Caglayan, 2001; Jagannathan et al., 2010). According 
to Avramov and Wermers (2006), in the United States 
of America, the explanation is derived from the e ects 
of the intra- and inter-industry allocation of fund assets, 
paying attention to the business cycle (economic changes 
between recessions and expansions), and to the investment 
sectors. Along these lines, greater performance related 
to the abilities of managers in Brazil has been shown by 
Brito (2003), Leusin and Brito (2008), and Malaquias 
and Eid Jr. (2014), among other academics, who found 
that some managers add value for investors. For example, 
Leusin and Brito (2008) note that some fund managers are 
skilled in investing in variable income and can anticipate 
the prices of these assets in relation to  xed income ones, 
thus achieving better returns than passive managers.
Considering an investor’s perspective, by studying the 
variation in funds’ exposure to risk over time in the United 
States of America, Naka and Noman (2017) identi ed, 
among other results, that there is a greater  uctuation in 
(i) US market betas in relation to external market betas 
and (ii) emerging market betas in relation to developed 
market betas, which may help investors who seek the 
diversi cation bene ts of investing in funds. In Australia, 
Gupta and Jithendranathan (2012) report that investors 
base their investment decisions on the past performance 
of actively managed funds and that there is little reaction 
to the risk between investment categories.  is is because 
the country is dominated by retired  xed income investors, 
due to federal government policies that oblige workers 
to contribute a percentage of their salaries to pension 
funds (Gupta & Jithendranathan, 2012). Also with regards 
to  xed income investments, this type of investment 
also has greater weight in Brazil, as  xed income funds 
are the biggest group of funds in terms of net equity 
(Brazilian Association of Financial and Capital Market 
Entities – ANBIMA, 2015). Probably, one of the factors 
that supports this position is the weight of  xed income 
investments in Brazilian government bonds, which usually 
remunerate investors with high interest rates and thus 
attract more interested parties, besides investors believing 
that government bonds are one of the safest investments 
in the market (Brière & Signori, 2013).
At the other extreme to  xed income are high risk 
investments, such as hedge and multimarket funds 
(Cumming, Dai, & Johan, 2015; Mamede & Malaquias, 
2017). Multimarket funds are similar to hedge funds 
(Malaquias & Eid Jr., 2013; Mamede & Malaquias, 2017; 
Varga & Wengert, 2011), whose investments are grouped 
by location and strategy, in which the location refers 
to the “where” or type of asset – for example, shares, 
government bonds, currencies, derivatives – and the 
strategy refers to the “how” or which option – for example, 
trading, long and short, interest, and currency (ANBIMA, 
2015; Fung & Hsieh, 2002). With this, it is assumed that 
investors have access to di erent levels of risk, considering 
that multimarket funds seek to diversify their portfolios 
between  xed income and variable income in order to 
provide better returns. Based on these points, we have 
the following hypotheses:
H0_1: there is no relationship between portfolio 
composition and fund performance.
H1_1: there is a relationship between portfolio 
composition and fund performance
2.2 The Manager’s Experience and Fund 
Performance
According to Bryant (2012), investment funds have 
objectives to be ful lled by their managers, ultimately 
requiring experience, competency, and speci c knowledge 
from them.  us, an investor who buys assets from an 
equity fund is really acquiring the manager’s expertise 
in choosing shares that provide better returns (Bryant, 
2012). In this sense, the manager’s experience can be seen 
as a measurement of his/her knowledge of the investment 
fund market (Li, Zhang, & Zhao, 2011) and becomes a 
useful sign for funds as it goes beyond the outperformance 
record and presents a positive and signi cant correlation 
with the following year’s performance and shows that 
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the managers’ abilities persist (Ding & Wermers, 2012).
 us, the manager’s experience can a ect the fund’s 
performance, for example due to questions related to 
the incentive to achieve better performance when the 
manager is still seeking to establish his/her career in the 
market; in addition, managers that have recently joined 
the market may be more concerned about being  red 
as a result of a low performance indicator (Chevalier 
& Ellison, 1999). Less experienced managers may have 
more incentives to work harder due to the long career 
that they have ahead of them and they are more willing 
to assume risks in the search for better performance, in 
order to minimize their likelihood of being  red because 
of low returns (Chevalier & Ellison, 1999; Li, et al., 2011). 
Although these arguments are present in the construction 
of one of the hypotheses of this study, it is appropriate to 
mention that Chevalier and Ellison (1999) recommend 
caution in their use.
 is negative relationship between the manager’s 
experience and the fund’s performance was also addressed 
by Boyson (2003), highlighting that more experienced 
managers are more conservative because they have more 
to lose in terms of personal wealth, current income, and 
reputation. Malaquias and Eid Jr. (2014) indicate that this 
relationship could be an indication of agency con icts, 
given that the manager’s experience could re ect speci c 
knowledge of the market in which he/she operates. In 
addition, Naidenova, Parshakov, Zavertiaeva, and Tomé 
(2015) identi ed that the most experienced managers 
are usually older than the least experienced ones, have 
generally been recognized by the market, and tend to 
be more conservative, probably because they continue 
applying some strategies and routines that were right 
in the past. 
In contrast, there are studies that show a positive 
relationship between manager experience and 
performance, such as Gibbons and Murphy (1992), 
who indicate that managers with less experience in 
investments assume fewer risks than more experienced 
ones because the former are more afraid of recording 
a low performance, compromising their reputation, 
and losing career opportunities. However, besides the 
studies that have found a (negative/positive) relationship 
between the manager’s experience and the performance 
of the funds under his/her management, there are also 
the authors Switzer and Huang (2007), who identi ed 
that the managers’ experience does not a ect the fund’s 
performance.  ese facts lead to the following hypotheses:
H0_2: there is no relationship between the manager’s 
experience and the fund’s performance.
H1_2: there is a relationship between the manager’s 
experience and the fund’s performance.
2.3 Number of Funds under Management and 
Fund Performance
 e number of funds under management can a ect the 
fund’s performance because, according to Bryant (2012), 
the management structure of investment funds (whether 
a manager manages a single fund or whether he/she 
manages various funds) can interfere with the investors’ 
wealth due to the e ect on the expenses, the number of 
businesses in the portfolio, and the changes in style and in 
the fund’s performance. One of the author’s  ndings was 
that the average increase in the abnormal performance 
is greater for management structures involving multiple 
funds than for the management of a single fund.
In contrast, Hu and Chang (2008), Hu, Yu, and Wang 
(2012), and Prather, Bertin, and Henker (2004) found a 
negative relationship between management structures 
involving multiple funds and fund performance. From the 
viewpoint of Prather et al. (2004), as the manager tries to 
manage more funds, he/she loses focus and e ectiveness 
in his/her work.  us, according to the authors, taking on 
more funds even surpasses the economy of scale bene t 
and leads to a negative relationship with the performance 
of the funds under management. It is understood that 
analyzing this question in the Brazilian market is also 
relevant, especially considering the concentration of 
funds (large quantity) distributed among relatively few 
administrator companies (Iquiapaza, 2009) and manager 
companies. In light of the above, we have the hypotheses:
H0_3: there is no relationship between the number of 
funds under management and fund performance. 
H1_3: there is a relationship between the number of 
funds under management and fund performance.
2.4 Manager’s Location and Fund Performance
 e region where the manager resides can a ect the 
fund’s performance, since home bias, or the tendency to 
invest disproportionately in companies that are in the 
investor’s country, state, or region, can lead to a diversi ed 
portfolio with an inferior position (Cuthbertson, Nitzschea, 
& O’Sullivan, 2016). Due to this, investment decisions, 
whether due to familiarity or access to information, are 
subject to local bias (Giannetti & Laeven, 2012; Ivković 
& Weisbenner, 2005; Seasholes & Zhu, 2010; Sialm, Sun, 
& Zheng, 2013; Solnik & Zuo, 2012; Tekçe, Yilmaz, & 
Bildik, 2016).
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Likewise, with regards to home bias from a manager 
perspective, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) found that 
managers invest more in companies that are geographically 
close to the funds and earn substantial abnormal returns 
in their local investments. Malloy (2005) suggests that 
analysts who are geographically closer to their investments 
have an information advantage that results in better 
performance, but creates space for agency problems. 
Teo (2009) reports that in a risk-adjusted database, those 
funds with geographical proximity to their investment 
markets primarily present greater performance (higher 
alphas) in relation to other funds. Sialm et al. (2013) show 
that despite the poor performance of the hedge funds in 
their study sample, the managers have a local advantage 
(better quality information, better monitoring, or better 
access to local hedge funds) that leads to a substantial 
abnormal performance.
 us, from a manager perspective, it is supposed that 
a similar situation could occur in Brazil with regards to 
home bias in terms of local knowledge and information 
asymmetry between local and non-local managers. For 
example, because they are at the center of the capital 
market businesses, managers that work in Rio de Janeiro 
or São Paulo may have more access to information and 
invest in more risky portfolios, which in turn can in uence 
the performance of the funds under their management. 
In light of the studies presented, we have the hypotheses:
H0_4: there is no relationship between the manager’s 
location and the fund’s performance. 
H1_4: there is a relationship between the manager’s 
location and the fund’s performance.
3. METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES
As a sample this study used those Brazilian multimarket 
funds with monthly data published in Economatica and 
at the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission 
(CVM), covering 2009 to 2015, and whose variables 
follow in Table 1.  e initial date was September 2009 
as this was the  rst date with data available involving the 
composition of the portfolios in Economatica, and the 
 nal date was December 2015, as this was the most recent 
period when the database for the study was composed and 
which enabled the ratio of annual risk-adjusted return 
to be calculated.  
Table 1 Variables used to test the hypotheses
Variables and abbreviations Estimator Expected relationship Base study
Performance
(Sharpe Ratioit)
The annual Sharpe ratio, which is characterized as 
a measure of risk-adjusted return and structured 
between the mean and stardard deviation of the 
rates of excess returns of an asset portfolio. To 
calculate the values the net return was used and 
the SELIC was used as the risk-free interest rate. 
Dependent variable
Ackermann, McEnally, 
and Ravenscraft (1999), 
Fonseca, Bressan, Iquiapaza, 
and Guerra (2007), 
Malaquias and Eid Jr. (2013), 
Sharpe (1966), and 
Titman and Tiu (2011) 
Portfolio composition
(Port.Compit)
Percentage of investment in each asset type (in 
accordance with the Appendix) to compose the 
variable income and  xed income portfolios.
Positive for variable income
(H1_1)
Naka and Noman (2017) and 
Shawky et al. (2012)
Manager’s experience
(Exp.Managerit)
Number of years since the manager’s 
registration at the CVM up to 1/31/2016.
Negative (H1_2)
Boyson (2003), 
Chevalier and Ellison 
(1999), and 
Naidenova et al. (2015),
Quantity
(Qt.F.Admit)
Naperian logarithm of the quantity of funds 
administered by the managers monthly in 
the period from 9/1/2009 to 1/31/2016. 
The Naperian logarithm was used to avoid 
problems of scale, since the quantity of funds 
is highly dispersed in the study’s database.
Negative (H1_3)
Hu and Chang (2008), 
Hu et al. (2012), and
Prather et al. (2004) 
Location
(Locationit)
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for 
managers that live in the state of São Paulo 
or Rio de Janeiro and 0 otherwise.
Positive (H1_4)
Coval and Moskowitz (1999), 
Malloy (2005), 
Sialm et al. (2013), and 
Teo (2009) 
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Variables and abbreviations Estimator Expected relationship Base study
Administration fee
(Adm.Feeit)
Maximum administration fee 
charged annually by the fund.
Negative
(IV)
Rochman and Ribeiro (2003)
Performance fee
(Perf.Feeit)
Fee related to the fund’s investment policy 
and calculated using the fund’s result, 
de ned in the model as a dummy variable 
and taking the value 1 for funds that charge 
performance fees and 0 otherwise.
Positive
(IV)
Ackermann et al. (1999), 
Malaquias and Eid 
Jr. (2014), and 
Shukla (2004) 
Size
(Sizeit)
Naperian logarithm of the funds’ average 
monthly net equity. The Naperian logarithm 
is used to avoid problems of scale, since 
the size of the funds, in reais, is highly 
dispersed in the study’s database. 
Positive
(IV)
Castro and Minardi (2009), 
Malaquias and Eid 
Jr. (2013), and 
Rochman and Eid Jr. (2006) 
CVM = Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission; H1_1 = there is a relationship between fund composition and fund performance; H1_2 
= there is a relationship between the manager’s experience and fund performance; H1_3 = there is a relationship between the quantity of funds 
under management and fund performance; H1_4 = there is a relationship between the manager’s location and fund performance; SELIC = 
Special System for Settlement and Custody; IV= independent variables.
Source: Elaborated by the authors (2016).
Table 1 Cont.
With regards to the dependent variable “performance”, 
in order to estimate the Sharpe ratio in this study, 
multimarket funds with at least 11 returns in each year 
evaluated were selected; that is, there is a Sharpe ratio 
for each fund in each year. For the purposes of analyzing 
the robustness of the results, the Sortino ratio was used 
(Sortino & Price, 1994; Sortino & van der Meer, 1991). 
 e Sharpe ratio is among the most widely recognized 
performance indicators (Varga, 2001) and considers 
the excess returns provided by the fund, weighted by its 
volatility. Although the Sortino ratio involves the same 
assumption, the denominator of its equation only considers 
the standard deviation of the undesirable returns.  e 
Sortino ratio thus uses the concept of downside risk (or 
downside deviation); that is, the spread of returns below 
an acceptable minimum (Eid Jr., Rochman, & Taddeo, 
2005; Fonseca et al., 2007).
In relation to the other variables in the model, for 
the test variable “portfolio composition”, in an attempt 
to group the investments by similarity and show 
segmentation between the categories of assets with more 
or less exposure to risk (Brière & Signori, 2013; Gupta & 
Jithendranathan, 2012), three groups of portfolio types 
were used: variable income,  xed income, and none, 
whose classi cation follows in the Appendix. Just like the 
dependent variable (Sharpe ratio), these variables were 
also calculated annually and represented by the mean 
of the monthly percentage allocated to each one of the 
categories during the respective year.
With regards to the test variables related to the fund 
manager, given the di  culty of information involving 
individual managers, proxies had to be created to measure 
them (Chevalier & Ellison, 1999; Malaquias & Mamede, 
2015; Switzer & Huang, 2007).  us, the “manager’s 
experience” was calculated in years by the di erence 
between the base date 1/31/2016 and the date the company 
managing the fund was founded.  e “quantity” of funds 
under management was estimated by the quantity of 
funds administered monthly by the fund management 
company.  e manager’s “location” was constructed using 
the location of the company managing the fund.
With regards to the other variables, administration and 
performance fees can be used by the investment funds to 
align the interests of managers and investors (Ackermann 
et al., 1999; Edwards & Caglayan, 2001) and signal superior 
investment skills and better fund performance (Golec, 
1996).   us, in the United States of America, managers 
who deliver higher excess returns tend to charge higher 
fees (Edwards & Caglayan, 2001; Shukla, 2004), which 
means that the bene ts of active management are not 
directly reaped by the funds’ shareholders (Shukla, 2004). 
In Brazil, Rochman and Ribeiro (2003) found a negative 
relationship between the administration fee and fund 
performance, and Malaquias and Eid Jr. (2014) found a 
positive relationship between the performance fee and 
the risk-adjusted return of multimarket funds.  e last 
variable studied was the fund’s size, given that in developed 
countries this variable has presented a negative relationship 
with fund performance (Chen, Hong, Huang, & Kubik, 
2004; Grinblatt & Titman, 1989; Gupta & Jithendranathan, 
2012; Pollet & Wilson, 2008), the reason for which may 
lie in the growth of funds without any increase in the 
number of assets, which reduces the optimal allocation 
of resources in their portfolios (Gupta & Jithendranathan, 
2012). However, in Brazil, Castro and Minardi (2009), 
Malaquias and Eid Jr. (2013), and Rochman and Eid Jr. 
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(2006) found a positive relationship between the fund’s 
size and its performance.
With regards to the structure of the variables in 
the model proposed for the study, equation 1 follows, 
which enabled an analysis of the hypotheses involving 
the manager’s characteristics, the composition of his/her 
investment portfolios, and the performance of Brazilian 
multimarket funds.  e meanings of the abbreviations 
for the variables (and form of measurement) are available 
in Table 1. 
 
𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅�� = 𝛽𝛽� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎. 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅�� +  𝛽𝛽�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎. 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎�� +  𝛽𝛽�𝑄𝑄𝑅𝑅. 𝐹𝐹. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶�� +
  + 𝛽𝛽�𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀�� + 𝛽𝛽�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶. 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎�� +  𝛽𝛽� 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃. 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎��  + 𝛽𝛽�𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎��+  𝜀𝜀��  
 
 
Observing other studies already carried out in Brazil 
involving fund performance (such as Milan and Eid Jr. 
[2014]), and similarly to the one carried out by Funchal 
et al. (2016), the quantitative model to test the hypotheses 
considers the ordinary least squares regression model in 
panel format with  xed e ects for year and standard errors 
clustered by fund.  is robust procedure was adopted 
because the standardized residuals of the conventional 
pooled data regression model did not present a normal 
distribution in the Shapiro-Wilk test (at a 5% level of 
significance). The quantitative tools were employed 
using the Stata® so ware. We also used robust regressions 
(Verardi & Croux, 2009) based on the MM estimator, 
observing the value of the breakdown point. To evaluate 
potential multicollinearity problems, the variance in ation 
factor (VIF) statistic was also used, and with the aim 
of treating the extreme outliers the variables presented 
in Table 1 were subjected to the winsorize procedure 
at 1%.  is procedure was employed with the aim of 
eliminating some potential bias in the coe  cients of the 
models derived from the extreme observations, and at the 
same time the 1% level does not substantially alter the 
characteristics of the data. In order to minimize potential 
problems related to heteroskedasticity, as previously 
indicated, the standard errors were clusterized by fund. 
Additionally, the analysis of the hypotheses was carried 
out based on the con dence intervals, since they can 
extend the statistical results to economic results (Ledoit 
& Wolf, 2008).
4. RESULTS
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of this study. 
It can be seen that in the period from September 2009 to 
December 2015 the sample of multimarket funds covered 
6,002 funds and 25,514 annual observations, with an 
average Sharpe ratio of 0.225; that is, on average the funds 
presented a higher monthly return than the risk-free rate, 
in most cases delivering positive returns (extraordinary 
returns) to their shareholders. 
1
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Table 2 Descriptive statistic of the variables for testing the hypotheses – September/2009 to December/2013
Variables n Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Sharpe Ratio 25,514 0.225 2.073 -5.574 6.204
Comp.Fixed.Income 25,514 0.204 0.300 0.000 0.999
Comp.Fixed.Income.20 25,514 0.328 0.470 0.000 1.000
Comp.Fixed.Income.30 25,514 0.277 0.447 0.000 1.000
Comp.Fixed.Income.40 25,514 0.232 0.422 0.000 1.000
Comp.Fixed.Income.50 25,514 0.192 0.394 0.000 1.000
Exp.Manager 25,514 14.307 6.649 0.503 27.119
Qt.F.Adm 25,514 5.140 1.749 0.000 7.058
Location 25,514 0.973 0.163 0.000 1.000
Adm.Fee 25,514 0.747 0.997 0.000 10.000
Perf.Fee 25,514 0.201 0.401 0.000 1.000
Size 25,514 17.374 1.477 11.270 24.072
Comp.Fixed.Income = percentage of the portfolio composition involving  xed income; Comp.Fixed.Income.20 = dummy variable, taking 
1 for funds whose portfolio percentage in  xed income is greater than 20%; Comp.Fixed.Income.30 = dummy variable, taking 1 for funds 
whose portfolio percentage in  xed income is greater than 30%; Comp.Fixed.Income.40 = dummy variable, taking 1 for funds whose portfolio 
percentage in  xed income is greater than 40%; Comp.Fixed.Income.50 = dummy variable, taking 1 for funds whose portfolio percentage in 
 xed income is greater than 50%; SD = standard deviation; Exp.Manager = manager’s experience in years; Sharpe Ratio = Annual Sharpe Ratio, 
considering the Special System for Settlement and Custody (SELIC) as the risk-free rate; Location = fund manager’s location, taking 1 for location 
in São Paulo or Rio de Janeiro and 0 otherwise; Qt.F.Adm = Naperian logarithm of the quantity of funds administered by the fund manager; Size 
= Naperian logarithm of the fund’s average net equity; Adm.Fee = the fund’s administration fee percentage; Perf.Fee = the fund’s performance 
fee, taking 1 for funds that charge and 0 otherwise. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Table 3 Estimate of the interference of the factors in the risk-adjusted return of the Brazilian multimarket funds
Variable Coef cient CI 95% Coef cient Coef cient Coef cient Coef cient
Comp.Fixed.Income 0.295 *** 0.179 0.411
Comp.Fixed.Income.20 0.180 ***
Comp.Fixed.Income.30 0.167 ***
Comp.Fixed.Income.40 0.166 ***
Comp.Fixed.Income.50 0.160 ***
Exp.Manager -0.026 *** -0.031 -0.020 -0.025 *** -0.025 *** -0.025 *** -0.025 ***
Qt.F.Adm 0.082 *** 0.057 0.107 0.081 *** 0.081 *** 0.081 *** 0.080 ***
Location -0.011 -0.260 0.238 -0.025 -0.025 -0.022 -0.021
Adm.Fee -0.110 *** -0.147 -0.073 -0.113 *** -0.113 *** -0.113 *** -0.112 ***
Perf.Fee -0.075 * -0.164 0.014 -0.069 -0.071 -0.073 -0.071
Size 0.148 *** 0.127 0.170 0.151 *** 0.151 *** 0.152 *** 0.153 ***
Notes: the models consider dummy variables for year and standard errors clusterized by fund. The variance in ation factor (VIF) statistics did 
not indicate multicollinearity problems among the variables, as all were below 5.0. Coef cient = beta coef cient or regressor parameter; Comp.
Fixed.Income = percentage of the portfolio composition related to  xed income; Comp.Fixed.Income.20 = dummy variable, taking 1 for funds 
whose portfolio percentage in  xed income is greater than 20%; Comp.Fixed.Income.30 = dummy variable, taking 1 for funds whose portfolio 
percentage in  xed income is greater than 30%; Comp.Fixed.Income.40 = dummy variable, taking 1 for funds whose portfolio percentage in  xed 
income is greater than 40%; Comp.Fixed.Income.50 = dummy variable, taking 1 for funds whose portfolio percentage in  xed income is greater 
than 50%; Exp.Manager =manager’s experience in years; CI = con dence interval; Location = fund manager’s location, taking 1 for location in 
São Paulo or Rio de Janeiro and 0 otherwise; Qt.F.Adm =Naperian logarithm of the quantity of funds administered by the fund manager; Adm.
Fee = the fund’s administration fee percentage; Perf.Fee = the fund’s performance fee, taking 1 for funds that charge and 0 otherwise; Size = 
Naperian logarithm of the fund’s average net equity.
*,**, *** = p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Table 3 presents the results of the hypothesis tests 
in terms of the interference of portfolio composition 
and manager-related variables in the performance of the 
Brazilian multimarket funds.
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 e results displayed in Table 3 reveal that in the 
sample studied covering the period from September 
2009 to December 2015 the average percentage allocated 
to assets classi ed as  xed income presented a positive 
relationship with the risk-adjusted return of the funds. 
However, a positive relationship was expected between a 
portfolio allocation in mostly variable income and fund 
performance, since Brazilian multimarket funds are noted 
as being a category of funds for variable income (Mamede 
& Malaquias, 2017). With this, the assumption was that 
the portfolios with the most exposure to risk (variable 
income) would be able to deliver a better risk-adjusted 
return (Naka & Noman, 2017; Shawky et al., 2012).
Probably one of the reasons for this positive relationship 
(between portfolio composition in  xed income and 
risk-adjusted return) lies in the growth  uctuations of 
the Brazilian interest rate during most of the period 
studied; that is, the favorable economic environment 
for investments in  xed income. For example, the annual 
SELIC rate was 8.65% in September 2009, 10.66% in 
September 2010, and 11.90% in September 2011 (Brazilian 
Central Bank, 2016). As described in the methodology of 
this study, we used MM estimators to evaluate whether the 
coe  cients would not be being in uenced by potential 
outliers. For this, we again estimated all of the models 
available in Table 3, using robust regression, and observed 
that the breakdown point was equal to 0.50 in all  ve; 
additionally, the betas of the performance coe  cients 
presented the same sign and level of signi cance (except 
for the performance rate variable, which became 1% 
signi cant in all of the models).  us, due to the results 
found, hypothesis H0_1, which proposes that there is 
no relationship between portfolio composition and 
multimarket fund performance in Brazil, is rejected.
It should be noted that significant changes have 
occurred in the regulation of Brazilian funds, with the 
revocation of CVM Instruction n. 409 by CVM Instruction 
n.555 of 2014 (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, 2004, 
2014). With the aim of evaluating whether these changes 
have led to some bias in the results obtained with this 
research, the models whose results are displayed in Table 3 
were estimated again, this time excluding the observations 
from 2014 and 2015 from the sampling period.  e results 
were equivalent in terms of sign and level of signi cance, 
except for the performance fee variable in the  rst model, 
which was not statistically signi cant as in the  rst column 
of Table 3.  us, we observed that although there may be 
some expectation of a signi cant change in the resource 
allocation decisions and even in the managers’ position 
as a result of the recent alteration in the regulation of 
Brazilian investment funds, when observed in a condensed 
way for the case of the hypotheses analyzed in this study, 
the e ect of the alterations does not appear to invalidate 
the results of the quantitative models.
In addition, as the criterion employed to classify 
the assets into  xed income and into variable income 
may also appear subjective, we carried out a new test by 
substituting the total percentage allocated to the assets 
classi ed as  xed income by the percentage allocated to 
shares, since this percentage can represent a proxy for 
investment in variable income. A er this, we estimated 
the model again. We observed that its beta coe  cient (of 
the percentage invested in shares variable) was negative 
and statistically signi cant at a level of 1%. We thus have 
another indication that the percentage allocated to  xed 
income tends to present a positive e ect on the risk-
adjusted return (indeed the other part allocated to variable 
income, in this case shares, presented a negative e ect). 
By substituting the percentage invested in equities for 
the percentage invested in shares in other funds, the beta 
coe  cient was also shown to be negative and signi cant.
With the aim of adding more elements to the analysis 
of the robustness of the results, the models whose results 
are in Table 3 were estimated again, considering three 
new dependent variables: in the  rst, Sharpe ratios lower 
than 0 were substituted by 0 due to the argument that 
a negative Sharpe ratio perhaps does not represent an 
adequate measure for decision makers. In the second, 
funds with a negative Sharpe ratio were excluded from 
the sample and the third considers the Sortino ratio in 
substitution of the Sharpe ratio.  e di erence between 
the two ratios is in the fact that the Sortino ratio only 
considers the volatility of the undesirable returns. Table 
4 summarizes the results.
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Table 4 Estimate of the interference of the factors in the risk-adjusted return of the Brazilian multimarket funds, considering other 
measures for performance
Variables
Negative Sharpe substituted by 0 Only positive Sharpe Sortino Ratio
Coef cient Coef cient Coef cient
Comp.Fixed.Income 0.155 *** 0.107 * 0.757 ***
Exp.Manager -0.011 *** -0.009 *** -0.059 ***
Qt.F.Adm 0.011 *** -0.041 *** 0.119 ***
Location -0.003 -0.060 -0.120
Adm.Fee -0.072 *** -0.090 *** -0.315 ***
Perf.Fee -0.044 -0.070 -0.354 ***
Size 0.051 *** 0.011 0.192 ***
Notes: the models consider dummy variables for year and standard errors clustered by fund. The variation in ation factor (VIF) statistics did not 
indicate multicollinearity problems among the variables, as all were below 5.0.
Coef cient = beta coef cient or regressor parameter; Comp.Fixed.Income = percentage of the portfolio composition involving  xed income; Exp.
Manager = the manager’s experience in years; CI (95%) = 95% con dence interval; Location = the fund manager’s location, taking 1 for location 
in São Paulo or Rio de Janeiro and 0 otherwise; Qt.F.Adm = Naperian logarithm of the quantity of funds administered by the fund manager; Size 
= Naperian logarithm of the fund’s average net equity; Adm.Fee = the fund’s administration fee percentage; Perf.Fee = the fund’s performance 
fee, taking 1 for funds that charge and 0 otherwise.
*,**, *** = p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
As the results in Table 4 indicate, even when the 
negative values of the Sharpe ratio were substituted by 
0, the percentage allocated to  xed income assets (in 
accordance with the classi cation in the Appendix to 
this study) presented a positive relationship with the 
risk-adjusted return. In addition, in a subsample that 
only considers those funds with a positive performance 
(Sharpe ratio greater than 0), the percentage allocated 
to  xed income continues to be statistically signi cant, 
however less so.  at is, even in a subsample restricted to 
funds with good performance in the period, the share of 
the portfolios in  xed income has a positive relationship 
with the risk-adjusted return. When another indicator 
of risk-adjusted return (Sortino ratio) is considered, the 
results point in the same direction.
 e second test variable was the manager’s experience, 
which revealed that less experienced managers obtain 
a better risk-adjusted return that more experienced 
managers. This is probably due to the fact that less 
experienced managers tend to be younger, are over-
con dent, less risk-averse, and have not yet established 
a career in the market (Chevalier & Ellison, 1999; Li et al., 
2011).  ese factors may lead less experienced managers, 
by linking good fund performance to permanence in 
employment, to risk more in the search for better returns 
(Chevalier & Ellison, 1999; Li et al., 2011).  us, H0_2, 
which proposes that there is no relationship between the 
manager’s experience and the performance of multimarket 
funds in Brazil, is rejected.
 e third test variable was the quantity of funds 
under management, which revealed that managers who 
administer more funds deliver a better risk-adjusted 
return than managers who administer fewer funds.  is 
positive relationship goes against the one highlighted by 
Hu and Chang (2008), Hu et al. (2012), and Prather et al. 
(2004), which was also expected for this study. However, 
it is seen that in Brazil managing multiple funds may not 
lead to a loss in e ectiveness in the services provided 
by managers, given that they delivered better fund 
performance. Additionally, managing  rms that have a 
greater number of funds under their management may 
also be able to optimize management costs and distribute 
the activities of selecting the best alternatives in the market 
to carry out investments.  us, H0_3, which proposes that 
there is no relationship between the quantity of funds 
under management and the performance of multimarket 
funds in Brazil, is rejected.
 e fourth test variable was the managers’ location, 
which did not present a signi cant relationship with the 
funds’ risk-adjusted return. For this, it is assumed that 
the home bias due to familiarity or level of information 
may even exist among fund managing companies in the 
Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo regions, but in this study 
the force of this bias did not impact signi cantly on the 
funds’ performance, which does not corroborate with 
the studies from Coval and Moskowitz (1999), Malloy 
(2005), Sialm et al. (2013), and Teo (2009).  us, H0_4 
which proposes that there is no relationship between the 
manager’s location and the performance of multimarket 
funds in Brazil, is not rejected. 
Regarding the other independent variables, 
administration fee presented a negative relationship 
with the funds’ risk-adjusted returns, which according 
to Rochman and Ribeiro, (2003) may be due to the 
information asymmetry between investors.  e charging 
of a performance fee did not present a consistent signi cant 
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e ect among the di erent quantitative models estimated, 
which di ers from the  ndings of Malaquias and Eid Jr. 
(2014).  e size of the funds revealed a positive relationship 
with the risk-adjusted return, probably because bigger 
funds are able to save on expenses and operating costs, 
which is consistent with the studies from Golec (1996), 
Castro and Minardi (2009), Malaquias and Eid Jr. (2013), 
and Rochman and Eid Jr. (2006). It should be noted that 
a er the composition of the portfolios, fund size was the 
variable that best helped explain the risk-adjusted return 
of the multimarket funds in the sample, based on the 
criteria considered in this study.
Also in relation to the variables that can a ect the 
risk-adjusted return of investment funds, another way of 
assessing the results, besides analyzing by the statistical 
signi cance of the coe  cients of the variables, is to assess 
the con dence intervals, which can extend the statistical 
results to economic results (Ledoit & Wolf, 2008).  us, 
as seen in the columns related to con dence interval in 
Table 3, of the variables used for the empirical analysis 
in this study, portfolio composition is the variable that 
most helps in the analysis of risk-adjusted return, since 
its con dence interval lies between 0.179 and 0.411. 
 erefore, in this data sample and in the quantitative 
model proposed, considering the manager’s portfolio 
composition helps explain a potential alteration in the 
average risk-adjusted return of up to 0.295 (this value 
is greater than the average Sharpe ratio for the sample, 
which as seen in Table 2 is 0.225).  
Continuing the analysis by the economic impact of 
the variables, the second test variable that helps most 
in the analysis of the risk-adjusted return is size, thus 
corroborating with the previous studies that consider 
this variable as relevant for understanding investment 
fund performance.
In summary, this study, involving the possible in uence 
of the manager’s characteristics and of investment portfolio 
composition on the performance of Brazilian multimarket 
funds, enabled it to be identi ed that the e ectiveness 
of active management occurred for less experienced 
managers who invested more in  xed income, with the 
management of multiple funds, and with greater size, since 
these factors o ered better risk-adjusted returns for the 
funds in the period from September 2009 to December 
2015.
5. FINAL REMARKS
 is paper looked at Brazilian multimarket investment 
funds with the aim of identifying whether some 
characteristics of their managers and the composition 
of their portfolios in uence their risk-adjusted returns. 
 us, this study was able to contribute by highlighting 
that the variables (about fund manager) that most help 
explain a potential alteration in performance were 
portfolio composition and the quantity of funds under 
management. As far as we were able to analyze in the 
academic literature from the area of  nance, the disclosure 
of a signi cant relationship between risk-adjusted return 
and the portion of portfolios allocated to assets more 
focused on  xed income or variable income does not yet 
appear to have been explored, especially in the context 
of emerging economies, thus revealing this study’s main 
advance.
 e paper also made a contribution for investors by 
highlighting that from the moment they choose the type 
of multimarket fund they are interested in, knowing the 
composition of the portfolios of these funds and the 
characteristics of the manager can represent important 
information in the search for investments that provide 
better risk-adjusted returns. For example, based on 
the analyses carried out in this study, less experienced 
managers presented (on average) a better risk-adjusted 
return that more experienced ones.  e possible reasons 
for this negative relationship between performance and 
experience include the fact that less experienced managers 
tend to be younger, over-con dent, less risk-averse, and 
have not yet established their careers in the market 
(Chevalier & Ellison, 1999; Li, Zhang, & Zhao, 2011). 
 us, these factors may lead less experienced managers, 
by linking good fund performance to job permanence, 
to risk more in the search for better results, which is in 
line with the arguments constructed in the theoretical 
framework based on previous studies (Chevalier & Ellison, 
1999; Li, Zhang, & Zhao, 2011).
In summary, based on the sample of 6,002 Brazilian 
multimarket funds with a minimum period of 11 months 
of publication in order to form the Sharpe ratio, the 
results revealed that less experienced managers, those 
who balanced their portfolios paying attention to  xed 
income, and who charge a lower administration fee, as 
well as bigger funds, o ered better risk-adjusted returns 
in the period from September 2009 to December 2015. 
 ese results were robust to di erent forms of analyzing 
the funds’ performance, even when only the winning 
funds from the sample period were considered.
In relation to the limitations of this study, the  rst 
may involve the need to create proxies, due to the lack of 
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information in the databases that we consulted, covering 
personal data related to fund managers, such as the 
national register of individuals, date of birth, schooling, 
and specialization in fund management, among others. 
 e second limitation refers to the classi cation of the 
assets that compose the portfolios of multimarket funds 
into variable income and  xed income. As multimarket 
funds can allocate their portfolios into di erent asset 
classes and in the Economatica database these assets are 
spread over 35 types (as presented in the Appendix to this 
study), the categorization of assets into variables income 
and  xed income may have been subjectively de ned, 
especially at times in which the assets were not identi ed 
in the guidelines of the CVM or AMBIMA (perhaps due 
to the recent alterations in the regulation of funds in Brazil 
mentioned in the results analysis of this study).
 e third limitation relates to the use of consolidated 
information from databases (Economatica database and 
information on funds accessed from the CVM  les for 
downloading). Although this information contains the 
data needed to construct the proxies in this study, if there 
is some limitation in its organization in the databases that 
provide it, the results of this study are also subject to the 
same limitations. 
 e fourth limitation may have been with regards 
to the omission of variables in the model proposed to 
explain the performance of Brazilian multimarket funds. 
Speci cally, we understand that the fund’s regulation can 
a ect the composition of its portfolios by predetermining 
the minimum or maximum percentage to be invested in 
each asset type. Also, it may occur that the manager, faced 
with the percentages to be ful lled, opts to work in a more 
conservative (with allocations close to the de ned values) 
or aggressive (with allocations further from the established 
limits) way.  is limitation opens up the opportunity for 
new research on the subject.
In addition, with the aim of minimizing the scarcity 
of research on the abilities of fund managers in emerging 
markets (Swinkels & Rzezniczak, 2009), for future research 
we recommend studying the herd behavior of managers 
and the way fund managers in Brazil work (individually 
or in teams). Similarly, other questions could contribute 
to the literature on emerging market funds, such as net 
entries and exits of funds, investment funds in fund 
quotas, private pension funds, and macroeconomic 
variables, such as the interest rate, in ation rate, and 
exchange rate variation.
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Appendix Types of assets that compose the funds’ portfolios according to the classi cation in Economatica and the 
reclassi cation of the composition of the portfolios in variable income and  xed income
Sequence Type of investment in the portfolio – Economatica Type of income
1 Shares Variable
2 Brazilian depositary receipt Variable
3 Transferable securities certi cate or receipt Fixed
4 Fund quotas Variable
5 Debentures Fixed
6 Time deposit and other  nancial institution securities Fixed
7 Differential swap payable Variable
8 Differential swap recievable Variable
9 Quick assets None
10 Options on gold spot Fixed
11 Stock loans and MS granted Variable
12 Stock loans and MS recieved Variable
13 Investment abroad Variable
14 Futures market – buy position Variable
15 Futures market – sell position Variable
16 Buy options – holder position Variable
17 Buy options – issuer position Variable
18 Non rev options – holder position Variable
19 Non rev options – issuer position Variable
20 Sell options – holder position Variable
21 Sell options – issuer position Variable
22 Repurchase agreements Variable
23 Other MV reg at CVM obj of pub Variable
24 Other privately offered sec Variable
25 Other investments None
26 Other pass and coll ops None
27 Term – purchases receiveable Variable
28 Term – work for purchase to pay Variable
29 Term – work for sale to deliver Variable
30 Term – sales to receive Variable
31 Private credit securities Fixed
32 Securities linked to agrobusiness Fixed
33 Public bonds Fixed
34 Amounts payable None
35 Amounts recievable None
CVM =Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission; MS = marketable securities; MV = market value.
Source: Elaborated by the authors (2016)
